Emory International Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 2

2021

A Tale of Two Treaties: A Study of NAFTA and the USMCA's
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Jerry L. Lai

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jerry L. Lai, A Tale of Two Treaties: A Study of NAFTA and the USMCA's Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms, 35 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 259 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol35/iss2/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

LAI_3.22.21

3/23/2021 4:14 PM

A TALE OF TWO TREATIES: A STUDY OF NAFTA AND THE
USMCA’S INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
INTRODUCTION
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) 1 has recently
replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as the premier
trade agreement between the three largest economies of North America.2 The
new treaty entails important changes to NAFTA’s existing dispute settlement
provisions, notably the near-abolition of the latter’s controversial investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. Taken as a whole, the USMCA’s ISDS
mechanism strikes a balance between the need to facilitate cross-border
investment, especially between Mexico and the United States, and the need to
minimize the controversies that surround ISDS in academic and political
circles. 3 This balance in turn helps encourage economic development across
North America, by insulating the USMCA from political risks associated with
ISDS that have frustrated other multilateral free-trade and investment regimes
across the globe. As a result, the USMCA may prove to be a viable template for
ISDS in the future.
The main body of this Comment will proceed as follows. Part I will present
an overview of the existing ISDS mechanisms in NAFTA as illustrated by case
studies. Part II will discuss the ISDS mechanism and other relevant clauses in
the USMCA, examining the renegotiation process and major changes made
compared to their NAFTA predecessors. Part III will analyze the possible impact
of the new mechanism on cross-continental investment. Finally, Part IV will
explore the viability of the USMCA mechanism as a template for future
agreements, as well as potential points of contention that may require redress
down the road.

1
The USMCA is termed The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) by the Government
of Canada, and The Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC) by the Government of Mexico.
This Comment will mainly employ the U.S. name “USMCA,” but Canadian and Mexican sources cited may
refer to the agreement by its other names. See A new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, GLOB. AFF.
CAN. (July 9, 2019); see also T-MEC, GOBIERNO DE México (Nov. 30, 2018).
2
USMCA: Agreement Reached on Nafta Trade Deal Replacement, BBC (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.
bbc.com/news/business-50733120.
3
See Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present, and
Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 301, 302 (2003).
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INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN NAFTA: AN OVERVIEW

NAFTA’s principal dispute settlement mechanisms are found in Chapters
11, 19, and 20 of the treaty. Chapter 11 contains the ISDS mechanism;4 Chapter
19 provides an alternative to domestic courts for settling antidumping and
countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases,5 while Chapter 20 applies to disputes over
the interpretation or application of the agreement.6
A. NAFTA Chapter 11 Provisions
NAFTA Chapter 11 allows investors from one NAFTA country (“NAFTA
investors”) to sue the government of another NAFTA country (“host NAFTA
country”) for alleged breach of its obligations under the treaty. This arrangement
is designed to provide investors with an impartial tribunal to hear their
grievances,7 while at the same time sparing their home countries the burden of
taking up their case and the risk of diplomatic escalation.8 The main investor
protections offered by Chapter 11 are as follows:







National treatment: a host NAFTA country cannot grant NAFTA
investors and their investments less favorable treatment than that
granted to domestic investors and investments;9
Most-favored-nation treatment: a host NAFTA country cannot give
NAFTA investors and their investments less favorable treatment than
that accorded to domestic investors and investors from any other nonNAFTA country;10
Minimum standard of treatment: a host NAFTA country must, at
minimum, treat NAFTA investors and their investments in accordance
with international law, in a fair and equitable manner with full
protection and security;11
Ban on performance requirements: a host NAFTA country cannot

4
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
5
Id. ch. 19.
6
Id. ch. 20.
7
See William L. Owens, Investment Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Threat to Sovereignty of
Member States?, 39 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55, 56 (2015). The author of this article is a former Democratic congressman
from New York. See Representative William L. Owens, U.S. CONG, https://www.congress.gov/member/williamowens/O000169 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
8
See Riyaz Dattu & Sonja Pavic, Canada Seeks to Reform NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Chapter, OSLER (Aug. 23, 2017).
9
NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1102.
10
Id. art. 1103.
11
Id. art. 1105.

LAI_3.22.21

2021]

3/23/2021 4:14 PM

A TALE OF TWO TREATIES




261

impose specific performance requirements, such as technology
transfer or minimum domestic content, on a NAFTA investor or
investment;12
Free transfer of funds: a host NAFTA country must freely permit all
monetary transfers relating to an investment of a NAFTA investor
without delay;13
Safeguard against expropriation: a host NAFTA country cannot
directly or indirectly expropriate, or implement a measure tantamount
to expropriation against, the investment of a NAFTA investor, except
for a public purpose and on a lawful, non-discriminatory basis. In such
cases, fair compensation must be offered to the investor in question.14

A NAFTA investor who accuses a host NAFTA country of breaching its
obligations under Chapter 11 may, after giving sufficient notice, 15 submit a
claim to arbitration under one of the following mechanisms:




The Convention of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention);16
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules; or
Domestic courts of the host NAFTA country.17

A final tribunal award is enforceable in domestic courts.18 Appeals can be
made to a domestic court, but the appellate court cannot rule on simple errors of
fact or law, or replace the tribunal’s decision with its own.19 Opportunity for
appeal is therefore limited.

12

Id. art. 1106.
Id. art. 1109.
14
Id. art. 1110.
15
Id. arts. 1119–20.
16
Includes the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which offers arbitral services in certain cases outside the
scope of the original ICSID Convention, such as when one of the parties is not a member state to the ICSID. See
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, WORLD BANK, https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/rules-and-regulations/
additional-facility-rules/overview (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
17
Overview
of
the
Dispute
Settlement
Provisions,
NAFTA
SECRETARIAT,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200202032656/https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/
Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions.
18
Id.
19
Aaron Cosbey, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: A Briefing Paper for the CEC’s Joint
Public Advisory Committee, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 2002) (“In the end this is not an appeal
process; the review cannot rule on simple errors of fact or law, or substitute a decision for the one made by the
tribunal.”).
13
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B. Chapter 11 Case Studies
While Chapter 11’s ISDS mechanism is not exactly innovative, 20 it has
remained, since its inception, one of the most controversial aspects of NAFTA.21
Over the past two decades, the Chapter has received heavy criticism as well as
support from legal, academic, and political spheres across the continent.
Critics of Chapter 11 have long slated the ISDS mechanism as primarily
concerned with protecting investors at the price of weakening NAFTA
countries’ ability to legislate or regulate in the public or national interest.22 Three
cases, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Ethyl Corp. v. Government of
Canada, and Clayton/Bilcon of Delaware v. Government of Canada, are often
used to illustrate this point.
1. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States
Metalclad Corporation (Metalcald), an American company, sued Mexico
under Articles 1105 (minimum standard of treatment) and 1110 (safeguard
against expropriation) of NAFTA for preventing the company from opening an
already-built hazardous waste facility. 23 The ad hoc tribunal ruled against
Mexico, stating it had violated both articles because (1) Mexico failed to provide
a transparent and predictable business environment;24 (2) the Mexican federal
government made false representations which Metalclad relied upon;25 and (3)
the local government’s refusal to grant a construction permit and refusal to
promulgate an ecological decree over the landfill site was improper.26
The tribunal notably stated its decision was not affected by Article 1114,
which allows a host NAFTA country to impose restrictions on investments from
another NAFTA country for environmental reasons, since Mexico had permitted

20
David A. Gantz, Addressing Dispute Resolution Institutions in a NAFTA Renegotiation, BAKER INST.
(Apr. 2018) (“There was nothing particularly radical about Chapter 11 for the United States. The sources were
the CFTA Chapter 16 (for the obligations to investors language) and the [] bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
concluded by the United States with several dozen developing nations since 1980, particularly the 1992 U.S.
‘model’ BIT.”).
21
See Staff & Lewis, supra note 3, at 202.
22
Julie Soloway & Chris Tollefson NAFTA’s Chapter 11: Investor Protection, Integration, and the
Public Interest, 9 INST. FOR RSCH. ON PUB. POL’Y 4, 5 (2003); Evelyn Iritani, Metalclad NAFTA Dispute Is
Settled, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2001), (“Critics of globalization say these trade agreements give private firms too
much power and undermine the ability of governments to protect their citizens’ health and safety.”).
23
Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 28-62, (Aug. 30, 2000).
24
Id. ¶ 99.
25
Id. ¶ 107.
26
Id. ¶¶ 86, 102–12.
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the construction of the facility to go ahead in the first place.27 In the end, the
tribunal awarded Metalclad more than $16 million in damages.28
The decision was controversial for three main reasons. First, it maintained
an unusually strict standard for transparency under NAFTA Article 102, by
requiring a host NAFTA country to pre-emptively determine its regulatory
positions and clarify any potential points of misunderstanding—lest it breaches
the “fair and equitable” requirement in Article 1105. 29 Second, it defined
“expropriation” under Article 1110 more broadly than prevailing international
customs.30 Third, the decision curtailed the ability of NAFTA host countries to
enact environmental regulations vis-à-vis NAFTA investments, notably by
bypassing an in-depth discussion on Article 1114.31
Mexico appealed the award to the Supreme Court of British Columbia
(“BCSC”).32 In 2001, the BCSC overturned the tribunal’s ruling on Article 1105
and found the tribunal overreached in finding Mexico’s misrepresentations
towards Metalclad amounted to indirect expropriation under Article 1110. 33
However, the BCSC refused to do the same regarding the tribunal’s “extremely
broad” definition of expropriation; it also declined to qualify the tribunal’s
dismissal of Mexico’s argument based on Article 1114 as “patently
unreasonable.”34 In the end, the BCSC granted a partial award to Metalclad.35
The Metalclad saga attracted considerable notice and debate over the course
of the case. Activist groups, international organizations, and even government
agencies across the continent condemned the tribunal’s award as abuse of the
ISDS mechanism, an attack against domestic environmental legislation, and an
infringement of national sovereignty.36 Both the governments of Canada and
27

NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1114.
Metalclad, ¶ 131.
29
See id. ¶ 76; Maximo Romero Jimenez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243,
247 (2001).
30
Jennifer Trousdale, The International Investor’s Guide to Retaining a Successful NAFTA Chapter 11
Award on Appeal, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 217, 222 (2007).
31
See Metalclad, ¶ 98; Jenny Harbine, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Deciding the Price of Free Trade,
29 ECOLOGY J. Q., 371, 390 (2002).
32
The appeal was heard in this court because the arbitration was deemed to have taken place under its
jurisdiction under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. Trousdale, supra note 30, at 217, 222.
33
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, ¶¶ 72, 77–78 (Can.).
34
Id. ¶¶ 99, 104.
35
Id. ¶ 134.
36
Examples of organizations include Greenpeace, the Sierra Club of Canada, the World Wildlife Fund,
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement
and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOB.
TRADE 209, 213–14, 276 n. 512 (2001).
28
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Quebec joined Mexico’s appeal as intervenors to argue the tribunal’s
interpretation of Chapter 11 was overbroad.37
In response to the reactions towards the Metalclad case, the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission issued a joint interpretive statement to clarify key aspects of
Chapter 11 and allay growing public concern. 38 The statement echoed the
BCSC’s decision in affirming that “concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ . . .
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the
customary international law,” and that “nothing in the relevant arbitral rules
imposes a general duty of confidentiality” on the disputing parties to a Chapter
11 arbitration.39
The statement plugged some of the loopholes within Chapter 11 deplored by
public opinion and the BCSC alike. Nevertheless it is important to note that
while the statement spoke on specific arguments in Metalclad in favor of Mexico
and the intervenors, it did not address the chilling effect created against domestic
environmental legislation by investors abusing Article 1105 in the style of
Metalclad.40 Moreover, judicial review offers little recourse to the losing side of
the original arbitration41—even if the appellate court determines the tribunal had
made errors of fact or law.42 Finally, the BCSC decision reduced the likelihood
of judicial review becoming more effective in the future.43 This means if a rerun
of Metalclad occurs on a different aspect of the ISDS mechanism (or any other
part of NAFTA), it is likely the appellate court would be equally, or perhaps
even more incapable, of reviewing the tribunal’s decision in a meaningful
37
Colin Freeze, Mexico Appeals NAFTA Ruling on Waste Dump, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 19, 2001) (last
updated Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mexico-appeals-nafta-ruling-on-wastedump/article4144851/.
38
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS. (July 31, 2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp.
39
Id.
40
See Bronwyn Pavey & Tim Williams, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Chapter 11, GOV’T
OF CAN. (Feb. 26, 2003), http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/inbrief/prb0254-e.htm#TheDispute.
41
See Iritani, supra note 22 (explaining that the parties ended the case with a payout of $15.6 million
from Mexico, which is not very far from the $16.685 million originally awarded to Metalclad by the tribunal).
42
Cosbey, supra note 19.
43
This is because the BCSC ruled that British Columbia’s International Commercial Arbitration Act
(ICAA), rather than the Commercial Arbitration Act, applied to the case. The former contains a far stricter
standard of review than the latter. Justice Tysoe reasoned since “investing” is included in the definition of
“commercial relationship” as defined in the ICAA, it should govern in this international case. While the ruling
itself is confined to a single Canadian province, the reasoning behind it may set up a precedent in
NAFTA/USMCA cases tackling the same question in the future (NAFTA Article 1136 states that tribunal awards
do not establish binding precedence, but there is no prohibition against tribunals referring to past Chapter 11
decisions; nor is there any mention of appellate court decisions to the same effect). See NAFTA, supra note 4,
art. 1136; see also Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process, 11 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 183, 199, 200 (2002).
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capacity. This is true unless the tribunal is deemed to have erred so greatly that
it exceeded its jurisdiction—a high bar to meet. In sum, Chapter 11’s detractors
contend that controversy behind the Metalclad case highlights important flaws
and weaknesses within Chapter 11 which remains to be fixed today.
2. Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada
In Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, the Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl), an
American chemical company, sued the Government of Canada over its partial
ban of Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT), a fuel
additive.44 MMT contains manganese, which in the form of exhaust, may cause
airborne manganese poisoning in humans.45 The additive is also suspected of
interfering with on-board emissions monitoring and diagnostic systems. 46
Concerned about MMT’s public health and environmental risks, the Canadian
Parliament introduced the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act (“MMT Act”)
in 1997, which banned the commercial importation and intra-provincial
transport of MMT.47 While the MMT Act was being deliberated in Parliament,
Ethyl publicly threatened to respond with a Chapter 11 suit.48 After the MMT
Act was passed, Ethyl made good on its threat and initiated a claim against the
Government of Canada, arguing the ban violated its rights under Articles 1102,
1106, and 1110.49
The arbitration was not focused on the substance of the case: much attention
was devoted to the question of jurisdiction.50 Most importantly, Canada argued
Ethyl had violated the procedural requirements stipulated in Article 1120.51 The
company filed a Notice of Arbitration on April 14, 1997, before the expiration
of the mandatory six-month waiting period following the date of the event giving

44
Cases filed against the Government of Canada: Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada,
GLOB. AFF. CAN., https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng (last visited May 19, 2020).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Ray C. Jones, Comment, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. REV. 527, 538 (2002).
49
GLOB. AFF. CAN., supra note 44.
50
See Jones, supra note 48, at 538–39.
51
See Id. (“Canada objected to the suit primarily because Ethyl had not waited six months after the
passage and implementation of the ban before filing a claim. . .”).
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rise to Ethyl’s claim.52 According to Canada, the Notice of Arbitration referred
to the entry into force of the MMT Act on June 24, 1997.53
While the tribunal did not reject Canada’s interpretation of the timeline, it
declined to withdraw jurisdiction over the case despite Ethyl’s violation of
Article 1120.54 The tribunal reasoned the six-month “cooling off” period would
have been of little use in the case, since it has been given “no reason to believe
that any ‘consultation or negotiation’ pursuant to Article 1118, which Canada
admitted the six-month provision in Article 1120 was designed to encourage,
was even possible.”55
Additionally, the tribunal noted that over six months had already passed
since the MMT Act entered into force, and Canada had still given zero indication
whether it intended to repeal or amend the act.56 Since the facts of the case did
not change, dismissing the present case would “disserve, rather than serve, the
object and purpose of NAFTA.”57 Ethyl was only obliged to pay the costs of
proceedings for its violation of Article 1120; the tribunal otherwise allowed the
case to go forward.58
After the tribunal’s decision, Canada settled with Ethyl for over $13 million
and gave a public apology. 59 Following a separate court challenge by three
Canadian provinces, Canada also withdrew its partial ban on MTT.60
In addition to sparking a new wave of Chapter 11 claims against Canada,61
the Ethyl case also gifted ammunition to NAFTA critics, who decried the
Canadian government’s forced retreat on public health protection in face of a
foreign investor. They argued the tribunal’s decision may create a precedent
where a host NAFTA country would be obliged to compensate NAFTA
investors whenever the government “wishes to regulate them or their products
for public health or environmental reasons.”62
52

Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (June 24, 1998), 38 ILM 708

(1999).
53

Id. ¶ 68.
Id. ¶¶ 79–88.
55
Id. ¶ 84.
56
Id. ¶ 85.
57
Id.
58
Id. ¶ 88.
59
Debbie Barker, 2018 Trade Policy Assessment, ME. CITIZEN TRADE POL’Y COMM’N (Sept. 2018),
https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/3160.
60
Id.
61
Scott Sinclair, Canada’s Track Record Under NAFTA Chapter 11, CAN. CTR. FOR POL’Y ALTS. (Jan.
2018), https://www.policyalternatives.ca/nafta2018.
62
Michelle Sforza et al., Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA
54
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Also controversial was the tribunal’s apparent tolerance of Ethyl’s rulebreaking behavior.63 It accepted jurisdiction despite the fact that Ethyl violated
Article 1120 of Chapter 11, which stipulates a mandatory waiting period prior
to initiating arbitration.64 Furthermore, the tribunal’s decision was made despite
its acknowledgement of the strong possibility that Ethyl intentionally violated
Article 1120. 65 The company filed the Notice of Arbitration while the bill
containing the MMT Act was still being debated in the House of Commons, in
order to dissuade lawmakers from passing the bill.66 Yet the tribunal remained
undeterred, ruling that Ethyl’s intentional breach with the specific aim of
disrupting the domestic legislative process of a sovereign state was not enough
to warrant dismissal of the suit.67 One of the main goals of ISDS is promoting
the rule of law, which invariably involves the strict adherence to established
legal procedures to ensure the rights of both parties are respected.68 If it is shown
that one party can deliberately flout these procedures for political purposes
without incurring any meaningful punishment, future parties would be less likely
to trust NAFTA’s ISDS mechanism to afford them adequate legal protection.
3. Clayton/Bilcon of Delaware v. Government of Canada
In Clayton/Bilcon of Delaware v. Government of Canada, the Claytons, a
family of American citizens, and Bilcon of Delaware, Inc. (Bilcon), a U.S.-based
company, filed suit against Canada in 2008 for rejecting their plan to develop a
quarry and marine terminal in Digby Neck, Nova Scotia.69 The claimants alleged
the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia rejected their project proposal in
line with the recommendations of a Joint Review Panel (JRP).70 According to
the claimants, this was not only legally unnecessary,71 but also conducted an

to Challenge Environmental Safeguards, PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 2, 2011).
63
See Jones, supra note 48, at 548.
64
NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1120 (“Except as provided in Annex 1120.1, and provided that six months
have elapsed since the events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration[.]”).
65
Ethyl Corp., 38 ILM 708, ¶ 87.
66
Id.
67
To be clear, the Ethyl tribunal’s dismissal of Article 1120 does not by itself speak to any defects in the
text of the agreement. However, unlike in the aftermath of Metalclad, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission did
not issue any statement to clarify or negate the more controversial aspects of the Ethyl decision, meaning the
Commission did not consider the decision so irregular to be worthy of discussion.
68
See Lise Johnson et al., Investor-State Dispute Settlement: What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS
Get us There?, COLUM. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INV. Dec. 11, 2017, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/12/11/
investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-trying-to-achieve-does-isds-get-us-there/.
69
Bilcon of Del. et al v. Gov’t of Can., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Case No. 2009-04, ¶ 5 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2015).
70
Id. ¶¶ 159–61.
71
Id.
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environmental assessment of the proposal that was “unfair, politically biased[,]
and discriminatory” every step of the way. 72 Specifically, the claimants
contended Canada’s conduct had breached Articles 1102 (national treatment),
1103 (most-favored-nation treatment), and 1105 (minimum standard of
treatment) of NAFTA.73
After clearing the initial jurisdictional hurdles, the tribunal focused its
Article 1105 analysis on one significant issue: whether the JRP’s emphasis on
“community core values” was fair.74 This emphasis played a heavy role in the
JRP’s decision to recommend the Canadian and Nova Scotian governments to
reject the project proposal. 75 The claimants cried foul over the role of this
criterion in the decision-making process, claiming that they had no prior
knowledge of it.76
The tribunal found Canada had breached Article 1105. 77 The majority’s
findings were based on the fact that the JRP’s recommendation improperly relied
upon the vague “core community values” standard, which was neither in
compliance with Canadian law nor communicated to the claimants beforehand.78
Therefore, the application of this standard violated the claimants’ right to due
process, since they were not given an opportunity to make or modify their case
based on the standard.79 After finding for the claimants on Article 1102 (the
Article 1103 claim was not considered, since “if a breach is found in respect of
Article 1102, a further finding of liability under Article 1103 would not, in any
plausible scenario, [a]ffect the measure of damages.”), the tribunal allowed the
case to move to the damages phase.80
Donald McRae, one of the arbitrators on the tribunal, issued a dissenting
opinion regarding the majority’s finding of an Article 1105 breach. McRae
disagreed with the majority’s assertion that the claimants were unfairly surprised
by the “community core value” standard.81 McRae notes what the panel referred
72

Id. ¶ 5.
Cases filed against the Government of Canada: Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada,
GLOB. AFF. CAN., https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
disp-diff/clayton.aspx?lang=eng (last updated Jan. 2, 2018).
74
See generally Bilcon of Del. Case No. 2009-04.
75
Id. ¶ 40.
76
Id. ¶ 591.
77
Id. ¶ 604.
78
See id. ¶ 591 (“The J.R.P. effectively created . . . a new standard of assessment rather than fully carrying
out the mandate defined by the applicable law.”).
79
Id. ¶ 590–92
80
Id. ¶¶ 716, 729.
81
Bilcon of Del. et al. v. Gov’t of Can., Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, Case No. 200973
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to as “community core values” were precisely topics “relating to the human
environment,” such as First Nations resource use, community history, and local
heritage.82 The claimants knew these topics were included in the environmental
assessment process, but were simply not prepared to deal with.83
McRae also disputed the majority’s characterization of the “community core
value” standard as a violation of Canadian law. He noted that such a
determination should be at least left to a Canadian court to make. 84 In the
absence of such a determination, a tribunal with no specific expertise in the
Canadian legal system should not automatically treat a potential breach of
Canadian law as a breach of an international treaty.85
McRae concluded his opinion by qualifying the majority decision as a
“remarkable step backward in environmental protection,”86 a sentiment shared
by environmental activists and groups.87 However, legal critics of Chapter 11
contend the decision highlighted an even bigger problem: an international
tribunal made a determination on whether a domestic government agency’s
actions breached domestic law, without any input from a domestic court or
deference to the domestic agency.88 In short, the Bilcon case raises the question
of whether a Chapter 11 tribunal has the power to review domestic legislation,
the answer to which may carry serious implications regarding Chapter 11’s
effects on the judicial sovereignty of NAFTA countries.
C. Additional Arguments and Counterpoints
The above three cases each demonstrate particular talking points used by
critics of Chapter 11 to prove their case. Metalclad highlighted the “chilling
effect” ISDS may have on domestic environmental and health regulations, as
well as the weakness of judicial review in Chapter 11 cases; Ethyl cast doubt on
the procedural integrity of Chapter 11 itself, while Clayton/Bilcon represented a
severe case of judicial overreach by an international tribunal into a NAFTA
country’s domestic legal system. Yet the critics do not stop here. To some, while
04, ¶ 25 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. ¶ 34.
85
Id. ¶ 40.
86
Id. ¶ 51.
87
See, e.g., Janet M. Eaton, Digby Neck Quarry Bilcon Case, Tribunal Decision and Dissent, SIERRA
CLUB OF CAN. May 11, 2015.
88
See Laura Létourneau-Tremblay & Daniel F. Behn, Comment, Judging the Misapplication of a State’s
Own Environmental Regulations, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 823, 824 (2016); see also Nigel Bankes, The
Bilcon Award, U. CALGARY FAC. L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2015), https://ablawg.ca/2015/04/07/the-bilcon-award/.
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these three cases highlighted the chapter’s “chilling effect” on domestic health
and environmental legislation, as well as the concept of national sovereignty,
they are not enough to encapsulate everything that is wrong with ISDS.
In the United States, these critics come from both sides of the political
spectrum. Simon Lester, a member of the libertarian think tank Cato Institute,
stated his most fundamental objection towards ISDS is that it “only gives rights
to foreign investors, not ordinary citizens.”89 For example, if the assets of an
American investor were expropriated in Canada, it may file a claim with a
Chapter 11 tribunal. But a Canadian investor facing the same situation would
have no similar recourse, since Chapter 11 tribunals do not hear domestic cases,
and Canadian law “lacks good rules on expropriation.”90 In a more nationalist
vein, fellow Cato researcher Daniel Ikenson argues ISDS mechanisms neutralize
an important American advantage—the respect for the rule of law—in the global
competition to attract investment.91
From the left, Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (DMA) have also come out against Chapter 11—albeit from a different angle.92
Aside from the aforementioned criticisms regarding national sovereignty and
“regulatory chill,” both senators have vaguely qualified the ISDS mechanism as
a NAFTA term that “promote[s] the outsourcing of American jobs.” 93 In
addition, Senator Warrens questioned the integrity of Chapter 11 tribunals,
calling arbitrators “highly paid corporate lawyers [who] would go back and forth
between representing corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next.”94
These lawyers, the senator suggests, are unlikely to “rule against those
corporations when it’s [their] turn in the judge’s seat.”95
89
Simon Lester, Responses to Some Criticisms on ISDS, CATO UNBOUND (May 20, 2015),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/05/20/simon-lester/responses-some-criticisms-isds; see Peter Bondarenko,
Cato Institute, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cato-Institute (last visited Oct. 26, 2019)
(“One of the most influential libertarian think tanks in the United States, it supports peace, individual liberty,
limited government, and free markets.”); see also Simon Lester, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/people/
simon-lester (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
90
Id.
91
Daniel J. Ikenson, To Save NAFTA, Kill Its Controversial Dispute Settlement Provisions, CATO INST.
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/save-nafta-kill-its-controversial-dispute-settlementprovisions.
92
See Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, Progressives Call on Trump to Fundamentally
Rewrite
NAFTA
(Feb.
2,
2018),
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
progressives-call-on-trump-to-fundamentally-rewrite-nafta.
93
Id.
94
Elizabeth Warren, Commentary, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-languagein-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.
95
Id.
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On the other hand, supporters of Chapter 11 (and by extension ISDS) say its
negative effects have been exaggerated. First, they point out the record of ISDS
rulings worldwide does not support the contention that arbitral tribunals are
biased in favor of foreign investors. As of 2012, tribunals convened under ICSID
rules have completely rejected the investor’s claim in fifty-four percent of the
cases.96 Even in instances where the investor prevailed, the damages granted are
typically less than forty percent of the initial amount sought.97 In the specific
context of Chapter 11, the latter figure is even lower98 (figure 1).99 It therefore
follows that these tribunals are not the expansive vanguards of corporate interest
as their detractors portray them to be. No claim by the claimant investor is taken
for granted; tribunals examine each one on their factual merit to arrive at a
cautious and well-reasoned conclusion.100
Second, the fact that investors can use litigation to influence government
decision-making is not inherently an “evil” prospect. 101 Government is not
perfect. Sometimes it may take an action that violates an international trade
agreement it has signed and ratified/legislated into domestic law.102 If such an
act harms a foreign investor, the investor would not be wrong to seek redress
from a forum whose proficiency and impartiality are ensured through a binding
international agreement designed to regulate the actions of states who have
voluntarily signed up to it.103 It is a fundamental rule of international law that a
state’s domestic legislation cannot override its treaty obligations.104 Failure to
uphold this rule would mean the end of international law as we know it.105 The
ultimate purpose of Chapter 11 is to hold the government accountable for its
actions. Far from being a corporate plot to undermine the sovereignty of states,

96
Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration:
Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 710 (2014).
97
Id. at 711.
98
Iritani, supra note 22.
99
Figures are rounded. Iritani, supra note 22; Ethyl v. Canada, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/16/ethyl-v-canada, (last visited Mar 5,
2021); Luke Eric Peterson, Canada Ordered to Pay $7 Million for Botched Environmental Review, but NAFTA
Arbitrators Reject U.S. Investors' Bid for $400+ Million in Lost Profits, INV. ARB. REPORTER (Feb. 29, 2019),
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/canada-ordered-to-pay-7-million-for-botched-environmental-review-butnafta-arbitrators-reject-u-s-investors-bid-for-400-million-in-lost-profits/.
100
See Owens, supra note 7, at 64 (“The central theme across each of these cases is that arbitral tribunals
made narrow decisions based on factual evidence.”).
101
Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11: NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 229
(2001).
102
Id.
103
Brower, supra note 95, at 720–22.
104
Id. at 721.
105
Id. at 721–22.
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this is a goal that speaks to the very notions of the rule of law and government
accountability.106
Third, even if the prospect of foreign investors holding government policy
accountable through arbitration is indeed an unethical one, Chapter 11 does not
go this far. Chapter 11 proceedings do not pose a direct impediment to the
legislative process and decision-making capacity of a sovereign state: arbitral
tribunals can impose financial penalties, but they cannot force a country to
amend or repeal the offending law or policy.107 A country may reverse course to
avoid further litigation and reputational damage, but this would not violate the
principle of state sovereignty, since demanding reparations from a state in breach
of its treaty obligations is a staple of international law.108 Furthermore, a Chapter
11 tribunal has neither country nor army to impose its will. It ultimately remains
to the offending state to decide upon its course of action.
Fourth, on Senator Warren’s claim that Chapter 11 panels are inherently
biased in favor of corporations, defenders of ISDS argue her line of reasoning is
supported by neither logic nor facts. Researcher Gary Clyde Hufbauer alleges
Senator Warren failed to “mention that arbitrators are selected from a large panel
of qualified attorneys and that each side has several opportunities to remove
candidates with a potential bias,” as well as the oath of impartiality every
arbitrator must take before proceedings begin.109 In another refutation of Senator
Warren’s claim, a blog post from the Obama White House noted arbitrators more
often side with the respondent government, and the United States has “never lost
an ISDS case because of the strong safeguards in the U.S. approach.”110
Lastly, supporters argue Chapter 11 is a better alternative than leaving
investors to rely on traditional state-to-state mechanisms. ISDS is designed to
prevent investor-state disputes from escalating to the state-to-state level, at
which the richer and more powerful country (i.e. the United States) would
inevitably have its way through forceful persuasion.111 By contrast, ISDS offers
106

Laird, supra note 101, at 229.
Owens, supra note 7, at 60.
108
Article 27. Violation of Treaty Obligations, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 1077, 1079 (1935).
109
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Senator Warren Distorts the Record on Investor-State Dispute Settlements,
PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.: TRADE INV. POL’Y WATCH BLOG (Mar. 2, 2015, 3:30 PM), https://www.piie.com/
blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/senator-warren-distorts-record-investor-state-dispute.
110
Jeffery Zients, blog, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers, WHITE HOUSE:
BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-state-disputesettlement-isds-questions-and-answers.
111
See Tim Samples, Winning and Losing in Investor–State Dispute Settlement, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 115,
134–35 (2019); see also Chris Evans, ISDS: Important Questions and Answers, WHITE HOUSE: OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:49 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/03/26/
107
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a more civilized way to resolve investor-state disputes. The benefits of this
arrangement are multifaceted: the foreign investor gains access to an impartial
forum, the investor’s home country is relieved of the political obligation to fight
the investor’s battle—regardless of the merits of the case—against the host
country, while the host country is insulated from any adverse action the home
country might take to protect the investor.112 ISDS may not be perfect, but it is
a far better alternative than the olden days of gunboat diplomacy.
The debates on these points go back and forth. On the last point, for example,
some opponents to Chapter 11 (and those to the ISDS concept as a whole) argue
the choice between ISDS and traditional state-to-state politicking is a false one:
not only is ISDS ineffective in de-politicizing investor-state disputes, there are
other ways to resolve investor-state disputes without having to resort to either.113
As we will see in Part III, it is apparent these debates played an important role
during the negotiation of the USMCA, since the negotiators clearly drafted its
ISDS mechanism with the aforementioned points and counterpoints in mind.
Whether these changes are effective in addressing concerns over NAFTA
Chapter 11, however, is a different story further discussed below.
II. ISDS IN THE USMCA: AN OVERVIEW
While the USMCA is not exactly a “radical overhaul” of its 1994
predecessor, the characterization is appropriate in describing the changes it made
to NAFTA Chapter 11, now Chapter 14 of the USMCA. 114 The basic
organization of USMCA Chapter 14 remains roughly the same to that of NAFTA
Chapter 11: a list of covenants (e.g. minimum standard of treatment,
isds-important-questions-and-answers, (“In fact, early in our history, the U.S. had to deploy ‘gunboat diplomacy,’
or military intervention, to protect private American commercial interests.”).
112
See Robert Wisner & Neil Campbell, Bringing the Home State Back in: the Case for Home State
Control in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Jan. 2018), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/
NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=522de4cb-caa3-4656-8236-f1e13f261b86.
113
Johnson, supra note 68. (Explaining that ISDS is not the only way to resolve international investment
disputes; one should therefore not assume that without ISDS, states would necessarily resort to force to protect
investor interests.); see See Geoffrey Gertz et al., Legalization and Diplomacy: American Power and the
Investment Regime, 107 WORLD DEV. 239 (2018) (finding no empirical evidence that investment treaties depoliticize investor-state disputes).
114
Compare NAFTA, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (showing Chapter 11 as “Investment”), with CanadaUnited States-Mexico Agreement ch. 14, Dec. 10, 2019, Agreement between the United States of America, the
United Mexican States, and Canada, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE: FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Dec. 13,
2019), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween, and Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) - Table of Contents, GLOB. AFF. CAN.: TRADE
NEGOTS. AGREEMENTS (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (showing Chapter 14 as
“Investment).
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compensation for expropriations, etc.) made by the parties, followed by a
thorough description of the ISDS mechanism towards the end of the text.115
An analysis of the USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanisms cannot be
complete without a discussion on their creative process. To understand how they
have changed, it is important to also understand why these changes were
proposed and made in the first place, especially in relation to their NAFTA
predecessors. This part will therefore examine each mechanism from two
perspectives: the positions taken by the parties regarding the mechanism at the
beginning of negotiations, and an overview of the mechanism as presented in
the actual treaty text.
A. Starting Positions
As one of NAFTA’s most contentious components, ISDS naturally did not
escape its share of controversy during the renegotiation process. 116 This section
will discuss the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on each of the three countries, as
well as how this impact influenced their positions towards ISDS at the start of
the negotiation over the USMCA.
1. Canada
Of the three NAFTA parties, Canada is perhaps one of the most impacted by
the agreement’s ISDS mechanism. From January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2017,
Canada has been sued 41 times under NAFTA Chapter 11 (figure 2),117 more
than Mexico or the United States. Additionally, Canada has also lost more cases
than the two other countries, having to pay in eight of the seventeen cases filed
it that have been settled or adjudicated by January 1, 2018.118 The Canadian

115

Id.
See Staff & Lewis, supra note 3, at 202.
117
This figures includes cases in which the claimant has filed a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration under NAFTA Article 1119, but has not yet submitted a Notice to Arbitration. See Sinclair, supra
note 61, at 15–30. The list provided on the website of Global Affairs Canada seems to omit some of these cases,
such as Shiell v. Canada and Omnitrax. v. Canada. Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, GLOB. AFF.
CAN: NAFTA - CHAPTER 11 – INV. (May 5, 2020), https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng. See also Elisha Dacey & Cameron MacLean,
Omnitrax Threatens NAFTA Challenge as Ottawa Files Lawsuit, CAN. BROAD. CORP. (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/omnitrax-files-notice-nafta-sabatoge-1.4401393 (“Omnitrax filed a
notice of intent to submit a claim under Chapter 11 . . .”); Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims
Under NAFTA and Other U.S. “Trade” Deals, PUB. CITIZEN (Aug. 1, 2018) (“The Shiell family [. . .] claimed
that it was not protected by the Canadian courts and various Canadian regulators in violation of Canada’s
NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations.”).
118
Sinclair, supra note 61, at 10.
116
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Centre for Policy Alternatives (C.C.P.A.) projected that the total sum of
penalties Canada had paid was over CAD 219 million.119 This does not include
Canada’s legal costs, of which approximately CAD 95 million is deemed by the
C.C.P.A. to be “unrecoverable.”120 These figures are echoed by then-Canadian
foreign minister Chrystia Freeland, who stated during a House of Commons
debate that NAFTA’s ISDS mechanism had “cost Canadian taxpayers more than
$300 million [Canadian dollars] in penalties and legal fees.”121
Canada’s unenviable track record under NAFTA Chapter 11 mobilized
public opinion against ISDS. In a 2017 poll commissioned by the Council of
Canadians (a non-profit political organization long opposed to Chapter 11),
sixty-three percent of the respondents agreed that NAFTA’s ISDS mechanism
should be eliminated from its replacement entirely.122 In the same year, a public
consultation conducted by Global Affairs Canada received multiple comments
expressing worry that the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in a renegotiated
NAFTA deal may “make governments less inclined to enact stronger
environmental laws and regulations.”123
Despite all of the above, Canadian negotiators initially took a lukewarm
position towards ISDS. The list of renegotiation objectives outlined by Minister
Freeland in August 2017 did not include the abolishment of the ISDS mechanism;
rather, the list only vaguely called for its reform, so to ensure that “governments
have an unassailable right to regulate in the public interest.” 124 After
negotiations began, further details on the Canadian position emerged: Canada
was trying to keep ISDS in the NAFTA replacement (which would later become
the USMCA) against the wishes of the United States, the country where the
majority of Chapter 11 claims against Canada originated from.125
119

Id. at 1.
Id. at 8.
121
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 431 (June 11, 2019)
at 28890 (Hon. C. Freeland) (Can.).
122
Janyce McGregor, Why NAFTA’s unloved investor-state dispute chapter may be in trouble, CAN.
BROAD. CORP. (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-isds-weekend-1.4814141; POLL: If
NAFTA Results in Bad Deal for Canadians and the Environment, 76 Percent Say Walk Away, COUNCIL OF
CANADIANS (Sept. 20, 2017), https://canadians.org/update/poll-if-nafta-results-bad-deal-canadians-andenvironment-76-cent-say-walk-away.
123
North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations – Initial environmental assessment, GLOB. AFF.
CAN. TRADE NEGOTS. AGREEMENTS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/initial_ea-ee_initiale.aspx?lang=eng#2.
124
Alexander Panetta, Canada’s 10 NAFTA Demands: A List of What Canada Wants as Talks Start This
Week, CAN. BROAD. CORP. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-canada-demands-list1.4246498.
125
McGregor, supra note 122; Sean Higgins, Canada Says ‘Hard No’ on Trump Change to NAFTA
Dispute Resolution, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/canada-says-hard120
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It is not difficult to see why this particular stance sparked widespread
confusion (and indignation) among observers. 126 After all, Canada does not
seem to have much to gain from the preservation of ISDS in the next iteration of
NAFTA. One may posit that retaining ISDS could help Canada maintain its
appeal to foreign investors, but evidence that bilateral investment treaties (BITs;
these usually include an ISDS provision)127 encourage foreign investment in
already-developed countries is limited.128 Alternatively, it may be argued that
Canada does not want to see Canadian investors lose their right to sue the United
States under Chapter 11 (Canadian investors will still be able to sue Mexico
under the ISDS mechanism of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a different free trade agreement), but this
view is not supported by history.129 As seen above, no Canadian claimant has
ever won a Chapter 11 case against an American respondent.130
The real answer may lie elsewhere. One possibility is the Canadian
government views Chapter 11 tribunals, which are not bound by stare decisis,

no-on-trump-change-to-nafta-dispute-resolution; Sinclair, supra note 61 at 15–30 (showing that out of the 41
cases against Canada, 40 of them were initiated by U.S. nationals and corporations).
126
The C.C.P.A expressed its “bafflement” towards Canada’s protectiveness towards the ISDS
mechanism, with one researcher noting that “[w]hile a lot of the Trump administration’s proposals in the NAFTA
talks are harmful to Canadian interests, [its proposal to abolish ISDS] is beneficial.” Dan Healing, Report
Questions Canada’s Desire to Protect NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Mechanism, CTV NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018).
https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/report-questions-canada-s-desire-to-protect-nafta-s-chapter-11-mechanism1.3761313. U.S.-based lobbying group Public Citizen noted the “irony” in Canada’s defense of ISDS—while
being “No. 1 in the world of developed countries that has lost under investor-state [dispute settlement].” Id.
127
See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, at 22–32.
128
While studies on the relationship between ISDS provisions and FDI are relatively scarce, the existing
literature largely suggests the effects of ISDS is relatively small in countries with a strong investment
environment. See LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EU-USA INVESTMENT
TREATY 44–46 (Apr. 2013); SERGE SHIKHER ET AL., U.S.-MEXICO-CANADA TRADE AGREEMENT: LIKELY
IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SECTORS 200–01 (Apr. 2019). “[T]here is no
conclusive evidence that BITs signed between advanced economies could promote investment.” Id. “Though
economic literature suggests that ISDS serves as a key credibility-enhancing mechanism in BITs, and that BITs
promote FDI to developing countries, the economic literature directly assessing the impact of ISDS provisions
on FDI flows does not find consistent results of such an impact.” Id. See also Johnson, supra note 68 (“Moreover,
evidence that investment treaties are actually effective at increasing investment flows is inconclusive, and
indicates that for the vast majority of investors, [international investment agreements] are neither directly nor
indirectly determinative of FDI decisions.”).
129
See The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Reduced Investment Protection in Mexico, the
United States and Canada, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/
kirkland-alert/2018/10/the-usmca-agreement-reduced-investment-protection (“The USMCA also eliminates
ISDS . . . Canadian investors in Mexico. However, such investors may be able to rely on the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).”).
130
Zients, supra note 110.
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as a better alternative than having Canadian investors litigating in American
courts.131 While state courts run the obvious risk of bias with their elected judges,
federal courts are obliged by Supreme Court precedent to grant large degrees of
deference to federal agency actions—all but guaranteeing a disappointing result
for the Canadian investor fighting to overturn an agency rule or adjudicative
decision.132 In addition, one of the purported advantages of ISDS tribunals is the
decoupling of investor-state disputes from interstate politics. Given the anti-free
trade and isolationist tendencies of the then-Trump administration,133 Canadian
negotiators may have felt the continued inclusion of an ISDS mechanism can
help prevent future investor-state disputes from escalating into full-blown
diplomatic rows that may spill over to other aspects of the Canada–U.S.
relationship.
Ultimately, Canada gave in. The final draft of the USMCA does not provide
for Canadian participation in its ISDS chapter. 134 Perhaps the United States
strong-armed Canada into accepting this exclusion, but given the lack of public
attention drawn by Canadian negotiators onto the subject, it is more likely that
Canada simply traded its position on ISDS in exchange for concessions
elsewhere in the treaty, such the continued inclusion of a tripartite state-to-state
dispute resolution mechanism.135 Therefore, while Canada seems to have been
thwarted on this front, it is likely the concession was a mere bargaining chip
used to obtain something Canadian negotiators valued more than ISDS itself.
2. Mexico
Tallying a total of twenty-three claims, Mexico was the second most-sued
NAFTA country under Chapter 11 between 1995 and 2017 (figure 3).136 It paid
131
See John S. Baker Jr., PhD & Lindsey Keiser, NAFTA/USMCA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and
the Constitution, 50 U. MIA. INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2019).
132
See id.; Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
133
See Bill Weld, Reclaiming Republican Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-08/reclaiming-republican-foreign-policy; see also Kevin Breuninger &
Christina Wilkie, Trump’s Hard-Line Views on Trade Were Formed Long Before He Targeted China With
Tariffs, CNBC: POLITICS (May 12, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/10/trumps-hard-linetrade-views-were-formed-long-before-china-tariffs.html.
134
Doug Beazley, Why the U.S. Agreed to Scrap NAFTA’s Chapter 11, CAN. BAR ASS’N. (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/hot-topics-in-law/2019/why-the-u-s-agreed-to-scrap-nafta-schapter-11.
135
See Ronald Orol, What Does the USMCA Mean for Canadian Trade?, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION (Oct. 2, 2018); see also Alexander Panetta, NAFTA’s Third-Party Arbitration System was Canada’s
Big Prize . . . is it Worth Fighting For?, THE STAR (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/
08/23/naftas-chapter-19-was-canadas-big-prize-but-is-it-still-worth-fighting-for.html.
136
Sinclair, supra note 61, at 39–45.
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a total sum of $386 million in penalties during this twenty-three-year period.137
Mexico is the only country that has never settled a Chapter 11 case: out of the
twelve decided cases, it lost five and won seven.138
Similar to the Canadian approach, Mexico’s position towards ISDS has also
been one of support. In October 2018, Mexican lead negotiator Jesús Seade
claimed the U.S. dropped its demand to delete ISDS from the USMCA due to
Mexico’s desire to preserve it.139 Mexican industry groups also lobbied for the
preservation of ISDS in the new agreement.140
Compared to Canada’s case, it is relatively straightforward to see why
Mexico is supportive of ISDS—despite the monetary losses it had suffered under
Chapter 11 proceedings. While ISDS mechanisms (along with other provisions
typically found in a BIT)141 may not be particularly useful in attracting investors
to advanced economies such as Canada, studies have shown their effectiveness
in boosting investor confidence are more prominent in developing and transition
economies such as Mexico,142 where concepts such as the rule of law, judicial
independence, and political transparency stand on relatively shaky grounds.143
In conclusion, Mexico’s support for ISDS is due to a determination that
whatever monetary penalties it was forced pay under NAFTA Chapter 11 are
outweighed by the boost in foreign direct investment (FDI) it received as a result
of Chapter 11. 144 If the impact of ISDS upon the Mexican economy is net

137

Id.
Id.
139
El T-MEC Pone fin a las Protecciones Legales de Empresas de EU en México, MANUFACTURA
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://manufactura.mx/industria/2018/10/22/el-t-mec-pone-fin-a-las-protecciones-legales-deempresas-de-eu-en-mexico.
140
Id.
141
BITs are also called International Investment Agreements (IIAs) in a more general context, especially
if there are more than two parties to the agreement. International Investment Agreements (IIAs), GOVT. OF SING.,
https://www.mti.gov.sg/Improving-Trade/International-Investment-Agreements (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
142
See SHIKHER, supra note 128 (“The literature generally finds that bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
of which ISDS provisions form a crucial part, increase investment, though a substantial minority of papers find
no effect.”); Henry Bamford Parkes et al., Mexico, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Dec. 29, 2019), (“Mexico has a
developing market economy that is strongly tied to that of the United States. . .”).
143
Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 715, 715–
16 (2004); see generally Mexico, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2018), https://www.transparency.org/country/MEX#.
144
See Azam Ahmed & Elisabeth Malkin, Mexicans Are the Nafta Winners? It’s News to Them, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), (“[NAFTA] has certainly brought positive changes to Mexico, economists note. Since it
went into effect at the beginning of 1994, billions of dollars in investment has been pouring into Mexico every
year.”); see also U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 2–3
(Mar. 26, 2019), (“U.S. merchandise trade with Mexico increased rapidly since NAFTA entered into force in
January 1994. U.S. exports to Mexico increased from $41.6 billion in 1993 . . . to $265.0 billion in 2018. U.S.
imports from Mexico increased from $39.9 billion in 1993 to $346.5 billion in 2018.”).
138
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positive, there would be no incentive for the Mexican government to seek its
exclusion from the USMCA.
3. United States
The United States has been sued twenty-one times under NAFTA Chapter
11 between 1995 and 2017;145 as of January 2018 it has not lost a single case
(figure 4). 146 However, U.S. nationals and companies make up the absolute
majority of claimants against Canadian and Mexican governments. 147 For
example, out of the forty-one Chapter 11 cases filed against Canada from 1995
to 2017, forty originated from the United States.148 In a similar vein, twenty-one
of the twenty-three Chapter 11 cases filed against Mexico during the same period
have American origins.149
However, the United States’ favorable record under Chapter 11 has not
endeared it to the current administration. While American business groups are
generally in favor of maintaining an ISDS mechanism in the USMCA, the initial
draft as agreed to by Mexico and the United States vastly reduced its scope and
competency at the urging of U.S. negotiators. 150 U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Lighthizer has been a particularly staunch opponent against ISDS: in
March 2018, he outlined his main objections against the inclusion of an ISDS
mechanism in the NAFTA replacement in his testimony before the House Ways
and Means Committee.151
First, Lighthizer argued ISDS grants foreign investors in the United States
protections not available to domestic investors. While domestic investors are
stuck with whatever ruling that comes out of a domestic court, their foreign
counterparts may simply circumvent the U.S. judiciary by resorting to an ISDS

145

Sinclair, supra note 61, at 3.
Zients, supra note 110; Sinclair, supra note 61, at 4.
147
Sinclair, supra note 61, at 39–45.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Janyce McGregor, Trump Announces U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal to Replace NAFTA, and Says ‘We Will
See’ if Canada Can Join, CAN. BROAD. CORP. (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-usmexico-progress-monday-1.4800182; see M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Fergusson, NAFTA Renegotiation and
the Proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), CONG. RSCH. SERV. 21 (Feb. 26, 2019),
(“During the negotiations of the USMCA, the U.S. business community strongly opposed reported U.S.
proposals to scale back or eliminate NAFTA ISDS provisions.”).
151
User Clip: Lighthizer-Brady ISDS, C-SPAN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/
?c4720505/user-clip-lighthizer-brady-isds.
146
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tribunal. This notion struck Lighthizer as not only unfair to domestic investors,
but also a violation of U.S. sovereignty.152
Second, Lighthizer saw ISDS as a way for the U.S. Government to
“underwrite” the risks of foreign investment: by signing a trade agreement that
includes an ISDS mechanism with another country, it is essentially establishing
a mechanism by which U.S. investors in that country would be insulated from
political risks that may otherwise render the investment unviable.153 This struck
Lighthizer as an example of government overreach. In his view, investors should
move their businesses abroad because it makes economic sense to do so (in
which case, it would be Congress’ job to fix this “problem”), not because the
U.S. Government had underwritten the risks of investing abroad. 154 U.S.
investors must venture abroad at their own risk; it is not the government’s job to
defend their interests in a foreign land.155
Lighthizer’s comments reflect a blend of anti-ISDS sentiments prevalent in
libertarian and conservative circles: not only does ISDS undermine national
sovereignty, it also promotes the loss of jobs and investments to foreign states.156
Both prospects were evidently unacceptable to the Trump administration, which
had built its foreign policy doctrine upon a platform of populist nationalism.157
It is therefore unsurprising that despite America’s “winning streak” under
NAFTA Chapter 11, as well as ISDS’ immense popularity with the U.S. business
community,158 the Trump administration had decided to push for its deletion
from the USMCA.159

152

Id.
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See Stewart M. Patrick, The Odd Couple: Democrats, Republicans, and the New Politics of Trade,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/odd-couple-democrats-republicansand-new-politics-trade.
157
See Simon Lester & Inu Manak, The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation of NAFTA,
21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 151, 151–52 (2018).
158
See Villarreal, supra note 150 (“During the negotiations of the proposed USMCA, the U.S. business
community strongly opposed reported U.S. proposals to scale back or eliminate NAFTA ISDS provisions.”).
159
Aside from total elimination, an alternative proposal pushed by the U.S. negotiation team was the
addition of an “opt-in” clause to the ISDS mechanism, which would in effect eliminate ISDS for countries that
do not want to make use of the mechanism. James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, How Are Trade Disputes
Resolved?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-are-tradedisputes-resolved.
153
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B. Changes Compared to NAFTA Chapter 11
Having explored the positions of the parties at the start of negotiations, this
Comment will now delve into the actual contents of USMCA Chapter 14,
complete with an analysis on how the starting positions of the above countries
have affected its formation.
The main differences between USMCA Chapter 14 and NAFTA Chapter 11
can be summarized as follows:



ISDS is eliminated between Canada and the United States.160 Canadian
investors in the United States will need to resolve any investor-state
disputes within the U.S. court system, and vice versa;161
ISDS between Mexico and the United States (Annex Parties) will be
limited to certain claims and industries as defined by the agreement:162
o Chapter 14, Annex 14-D regulates investor-state disputes
between the Annex Parties. Compared to NAFTA Chapter 11,
it disallows claims for indirect expropriation and contains more
stringent procedural requirements;163
o Chapter 14, Annex 14-E, as a modification of Annex 14-D,
specifically covers Mexico-U.S. investment disputes regarding
“covered government contracts,” which are limited to
agreements between an investor and a “national authority” of
the respondent State related to a certain “covered sector.”164
Qualifying claimants may bring indirect expropriation claims
under this annex; they need not go through domestic courts
before bringing their case to arbitration.165

It should also be noted that while USMCA Chapter 14 does not provide an
ISDS mechanism between Canada and Mexico, investors between the two
countries may instead resort to the CPTPP. 166 The ISDS provisions of the
160

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, at ch. 14.
Existing investments made between Jan. 1, 1994 and the termination date of NAFTA are defined as
“legacy investments.” Under the USMCA, Canadian, Mexican, and U.S investors may raise NAFTA Chapter
11 claims with respect to legacy investments within three years after the termination of NAFTA. In addition,
this three-year window does not limit currently pending cases or any legacy claims that have already been filed
under NAFTA Chapter 11. Id. at ch. 14, annex 14-C.
162
Id. at annexes 14-D & 14-E.
163
The more notable of these changes will be explored in detail in this section below.
164
Includes oil and gas, power generation, telecommunications, transportation, and the ownership or
management of infrastructure. Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, at annex 14-E.
165
Id. at annex 14-E.
166
Daniel Gracia-Barragan et al., The New NAFTA: Scaled-Back Arbitration in the USMCA, 36 J. INT’L
161
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CPTPP are generally less investor-friendly than those of NAFTA, but
nevertheless operate along the same basic framework as NAFTA Chapter 11.167
Therefore, in realistic terms, the greatest impact of USMCA Chapter 14 falls
upon the Canada-U.S. front, with the Mexico-U.S. and Canada-Mexico fronts
place at a distant second and third, respectively.
Out of the three countries, Mexico seemed to have attained the most of its
objectives; it managed to maintain a partial ISDS mechanism vis-a-vis the
United States, whose administration in turn succeeded in reducing the scope of
ISDS in the new agreement.168 Canada seems to have come off the worst, since
it has been entirely excluded from USMCA Chapter 14 against its will.169 Given
the scaling back of the USMCA’s ISDS provisions had already appeared in an
initial Mexico-U.S. draft which saw no Canadian input, it is doubtful whether
Canada had any meaningful opportunity to challenge its exclusion in face of the
fait accompli presented by its negotiating partners.170 While Canada retains an
ISDS mechanism with Mexico through the CPTPP, that mechanism nevertheless
belongs to a separate agreement that was happening regardless of the fate of its
North American counterpart. It could, therefore, hardly be celebrated by Canada
as a victory.
Taking the above developments into view, there are several other noteworthy
differences between USMCA Chapter 14 and NAFTA Chapter 11, aside from
Canada’s withdrawal from the former mechanism. First, in disallowing indirect
expropriation claims, Annex 14-D eliminated the basis for the Metalclad

ARB. 739, 749 (2019).
167
See Beazley, supra note 134; see also Teddy Baldwin et al., The New NAFTA – the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Brings Future Changes to ISDS, GLOB. ARB. NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/the-new-nafta-20181004/ (“The ISDS provisions under the CPTPP are
narrower than those under . . . NAFTA. They impose a higher burden of proof on investors to establish breaches
of investment obligations and give governments more leeway to implement public welfare measures without
giving rise to claims of expropriation.”).
168
It must be noted again that U.S. companies and business groups were mainly opposed to the scaling
down of ISDS in the USMCA. See Villarreal, supra note 150 (“During the negotiations of the proposed USMCA,
the U.S. business community strongly opposed reported U.S. proposals to scale back or eliminate NAFTA ISDS
provisions.”).
169
This did not stop Ottawa from framing the abolition of ISDS as a triumph of Canadian diplomacy.
Since most of this rhetoric came after the finalization of the USMCA, the Canadian government may have simply
decided to explain its defeat in the best light possible by capitalizing on anti-ISDS sentiments among the
opposition and the Canadian public. See House of Commons Debates, supra note 121, at 28911.
170
See McGregor, supra note 122 (“The preliminary trade agreement the U.S. recently reached with
Mexico may offer a glimpse of what could happen with NAFTA’s Chapter 11. . . opponents . . ., including the
Council of Canadians, cheered the preliminary agreement with Mexico as a sign that ISDS could be weakened
in a renegotiated NAFTA.”).
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tribunal’s controversial decision to hold Mexico liable for indirectly
expropriating Metalclad’s investment.171
Second, Annex 14-D tightened procedural requirements for all ISDS claims,
allowing a claim to go before a tribunal only after the claimant either received a
final decision from a domestic court of the respondent state, or once thirty
months passed following the initiation of proceedings in a domestic court.172
While these additional rules—made with the intent to raise the bar of
admissibility—do not explicitly forbid a tribunal from overlooking breaches of
procedure in the style of Ethyl, they may make a rerun of the case far less likely
by compelling the claimant to litigate in a domestic court before resorting to a
tribunal. 173 If the claimant decides to breach this requirement by initiating
proceedings before a USMCA tribunal prematurely, the tribunal would have a
readily available reason to order dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Since the
case is already sitting inside a domestic court, it would save time and resources
for all parties involved to at least hear back from that court before starting the
whole process again in a different forum.
These procedural changes also have significant implications when placed in
the context of the Clayton/Bilcon case. A major complaint directed against the
majority’s decision (as exemplified in Professor Donald McRae’s dissent)174
was that the tribunal took it upon itself to decide the JRP’s “community core
values” approach was not in conformity with Canadian law.175 Under Annex 14D, a domestic court will have the opportunity to rule on questions involving
domestic law before the case is passed to a tribunal.176
Third, Annex 14-D requires all arbitrators to comply with the International
Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, as well as any other “guidelines regarding direct or indirect conflicts
of interest, or any supplemental guidelines or rules adopted by the Annex
Parties.”177 Additionally, arbitrators cannot take orders from any organization or
government regarding the case they are sitting on; nor can they act as counsel,
party-appointed expert, or witness in any pending arbitration under USMCA
171
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, art. 14.D.3, annex 14-D. See Metalclad, 40
ILM 36, at ¶¶ 102-112.
172
Id. art. 14.D.5.
173
Ethyl Corp., 38 ILM 708, ¶¶ 84–85, 88.
174
Bilcon of Del., Dissent, Case No. 2009-04, ¶ 34.
175
See id. ¶ 591 (“The JRP effectively created . . . a new standard of assessment rather than fully carrying
out the mandate defined by the applicable law.”).
176
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, art. 14.D.6, annex 14-D.
177
Id.
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Chapter 14.178 By mandating an internationally-recognized standard on conflicts
of interest and limiting the space for improper conduct, the drafters of USMCA
Chapter 14 evidently aimed to address the allegations made against the integrity
and impartiality of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrators.179
Fourth, Annex 14-E applies only to a small number of heavily-regulated
sectors such as energy and infrastructure, as well as a narrow range of investorstate relationships that involves the national government of an Annex Party.180
For example, the annex takes a literal interpretation of the term “written
agreement,” stating specifically that permits, licenses, certificates, grants,
decrees, and judgments do not fall under its scope. 181 Thus, as long as the
national government of one Annex Party did not sign and execute a contract with
an investor from the other Annex Party, the national government will not run the
risk of facing liability under Annex 14-E—even if it had granted a permit to that
investor as in the case of Metalclad.182
Finally, Articles 14.5 and 14.6, which mandate national and most-favorednation treatment under “like circumstances,” also expressly state whether
treatment is accorded in “‘like circumstances’ . . . depends on the totality of the
circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between
investors or investments on the basis of legitimate public welfare objectives.”183
In sum, the investor protections offered by USMCA Chapter 14 are more limited
and less accessible than their NAFTA predecessors. As the next section
demonstrates, this development will have an impact on future trade and
investment relations between the three three signatory states.
III. WILL THE CHANGES BE GOOD OR BAD FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT?
Building on the overview of the changes made to NAFTA Chapter 11 in the
USMCA, this section focuses on the main question posed by this Comment: will
the USMCA’s ISDS mechanism facilitate economic interactions between the
signatory states? Over the past four centuries, there has been a broad consensus
among mainstream economists that international trade and investment drives

178

Id.
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 94.
180
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, at annex 14-E.
181
Id.
182
See Metalclad, 40 ILM 36, ¶ 98; see also U.S.-Canada ISDS Is Terminated, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/nafta-2.0-and-isds-analysis.pdf.
183
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, arts. 14.4, 14.5.
179
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growth and raises living standards across national borders.184 While there are
caveats to this general rule (e.g., short-term growth may be unevenly distributed
among populations and industries), 185 the notion that free trade promotes
economic development on a macro level remains an axiom of mainstream
economics.186
Assuming this axiom contains a modicum of truth, will the USMCA’s ISDS
Mechanism promote economic development? The discussion in Section II has
shown the efficacy of international investor protection treaties depends largely
upon the signatory states’ level of socio-economic development: the less
developed the target country, the less likely potential investors will believe their
investments are safe without treaty protection.187 In the North American context,
this will mean the abrogation of ISDS between Canada and the United States is
unlikely to have a sustained economic impact upon either country.188 Similarly,
Canada’s investment relationship with Mexico is also unlikely to change, due to
both countries’ participation in the CPTPP and its ISDS provisions.189
Therefore, the key question here plays out between Mexico and the United
States, who maintain with each other an ISDS mechanism through USMCA
Chapter 14. As seen in Section II above, USMCA Chapter 14 is a watered-down
version of NAFTA Chapter 11 in terms of applicability and scope. Unlike its
fellow signatory states, Mexico is a developing country, whose economic output
and living standards remain inferior to those of the United States. 190 If the
184
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK
IV, CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM (Mar. 9, 1776) (published online Feb, 28, 2009),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-h/3300-h.htm. See also, e.g., Anna Maria Mayda & Dani Rodrik,
Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8461, 2001) (“The consensus among mainstream economists on the desirability of free trade
remains almost universal.”); Jeffery A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 379, 380–81, 394 (1999).
185
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, What Economists (Including Me) Got Wrong About Globalization,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-10/inequality-globalization-andthe-missteps-of-1990s-economics.

The pro-globalization consensus[,] . . . which concluded that trade contributed little to rising
inequality, relied on models that asked how the growth of trade had affected the incomes of broad
classes of workers . . . Consensus economists didn’t turn much to analytic methods that focus on
workers in particular industries and communities, which would have given a better picture of
short-run trends. This was, I now believe, a major mistake—one in which I shared a hand.
Id.
186
187
188
189
190

Mayda, supra note 184.
SHIKHER, supra note 128.
See id. at 200–01
Gracia-Barragan, supra note 166, at 749.
See Parkes, supra note 142.
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aforementioned rule between developed economies does not apply to the
Mexico-U.S. investment relationship, what will?
The 2019 International Trade Commission (USITC) report on the potential
economic impacts of the USMCA may offer some insight into this question.191
The report borrows an estimate from previous literature192 that the ratification of
a BIT is correlated with a 4.8 percent increase of a signatory state’s outward FDI
stock in the short term, and assumes the removal of such a treaty would reduce
outward FDI stock by the same amount.193 However, given that ISDS is only
part of a typical BIT (or other multilateral investment treaties), the 4.8 percent
drop is not entirely attributable to the removal of ISDS alone.194 As seen in
Section II, the USMCA only curtails ISDS between Mexico and the United
States, rather than removing it. Accordingly, the USITC report estimates that
USMCA Chapter 14 may result in a $2.9 billion (0.44 percent) reduction in
overall (domestic and foreign) capital investment in Mexico. 195 The report
further expects the decline of American and Canadian investment in Mexico to
be “compensated in part by increasing investment from other countries.” 196
Meanwhile, the reduction of investment in Mexico is only expected to
marginally boost domestic investment within the United States.197
But the potential impact of USMCA Chapter 14 does not stop here. The
USITC report focused on calculating the economic dimension of the USCMA
and its ISDS mechanism; the socio-political dimension—which forms the heart
of this Comment—is equally, if not more important, than pure economic
analysis.
Why is this? Ten years after the end of the Great Recession, its sociopolitical effects have continued to reverberate across the developed world, long
after the global economy began to recuperate at the start of the 2010s.198 Populist
politics, encouraged by rising income inequality and a slow, austerity-laced

191
The International Trade Commission is an independent agency of the U.S. Government. About the
USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2020).
192
See Peter Egger & Valeria Merlo. The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI Dynamics, 30
WORLD ECON. 1536 (2007).
193
SHIKHER, supra note 128, at 202.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 203.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 199.
198
Press Release, Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions (June 8,
2020).
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economic recovery process,199 made its mark in various political movements,
elections, and referendums on both sides of the Atlantic,200 challenging the oftmaligned (yet ill-defined) “neoliberal ideology” from both ends of the political
spectrum.201 Domestically, populists blame the problems in their countries on an
“establishment consisting of cosmopolitan elites”; in the international context,
the blame is put on international institutions, such as NAFTA and the United
Nations, which are perceived as tools used by a global alliance of these
cosmopolitan elites to engage in self-serving policymaking at the expense of the
common man.202
It is not difficult to perceive the damage this new wave of populism has
inflicted upon existing and prospective free-trade and investment regimes. The
proposed U.S.-E.U. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was
shelved in face of sustained populist and nationalist opposition from Europe.203
199
See Lola Fadulu, Study Shows Income Gap Between Rich and Poor Keeps Growing, With Deadly
Effects, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019) for a discussion of income inequality. Fadulu notes “[i]ncome inequality
has roiled American society and politics for years, animating the rise of Barack Obama out of the collapse of the
financial system in 2008, energizing right-wing populism and the emergence of nationalist leaders like Donald
J. Trump, and pushing the Democratic Party leftward.” Id. See Frances Coppola, Fiscal Austerity After The
Great Recession Was A Catastrophic Mistake, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2017) for a discussion of the economic
recovery process. Coppola argues that “[t]he UK was not the only country to replace fiscal expansion with fiscal
austerity, to the detriment of its recovery. Many other countries did so to, to a greater or lesser extent.” Id.
200
See, e.g., Antonis Galanopoulos, Why not all populism is bad populism, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2016).
Galanopoulos notes the following about populism:

Populism has re-emerged as central to political debates across the world, from Latin America to
southern Europe, from the U.S. to the U.K. Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008,
populism has come back to the fore and its presence expands increasingly each year. . . Two
prominent examples are the U.S. presidential elections and Britain’s EU referendum. Donald
Trump is characterized by media, commentators and politicians as a right-wing populist politician,
as Bernie Sanders was previously considered a left-wing populist. . . Populism is not an
unfamiliar concept in the U.S. either. . . More recently, the Occupy Wall Street movement and
the Tea Party were also considered expressions of left-wing and right-wing populism,
respectively.
Id.
201
See, e.g., Jeremy Corbyn (@jeremycorbyn), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:12 AM), https://twitter.com/
jeremycorbyn/status/975313875062190080; see also Tucker Carlson, John Kerry sought political help from
overseas, FOX NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/john-kerry-sought-political-helpfrom-overseas (“Thirty years later, ordinary Americans are poor, wages haven’t moved, and all of us are less
free. But China and our neoliberal elite are a lot richer.”); EMMA BELL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERALISM
139 (2011).
202
Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash 1, 16 (University of Chicago Public
Law and Legal Theory Paper Series, Working Paper No. 606, 2017).
203
See Jeroen van der Waal & Willem de Koster, Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance
of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in the Netherlands, 66 POL. STUD. 560
(2017); see also Molly Scott Cato, People Power is Ending TTIP and Other Unpopular EU Free-Trade Deals,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2016).
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The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade agreement consisting of
eleven signatory states around the Pacific Rim, was attacked by populist
candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties during the 2016
presidential election and eventually scrapped after President Trump called off
U.S. involvement in 2017. 204 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union is currently stuck
in legal limbo, mainly due to the reluctance of populist European governments
to ratify the deal. 205 Finally, the very subject of this Comment—the
renegotiation of NAFTA—was instigated by a White House espousing a
populist trade policy. 206 In cases such as the TTIP and CETA, much of the
objection towards these treaties was focused on their ISDS provisions for all the
reasons mentioned earlier in this Comment.207 Some of these objections even
proved to be the main obstacle to the realization of the treaty in question.208
The economic consequences of these setbacks can be severe. One year
before the United States pulled out from the TPP, the USITC estimated the treaty
would result in a 0.15 percent increase to the country’s annual real GDP by
2032.209 The World Bank was even more optimistic: it expected “the TPP [to]
increase member country GDP on average by 1.1%, ranging from over 8% for
Vietnam to 0.5% for the United States.”210 Since the TPP never came into being,

204
Dominic Rushe, Bernie Sanders Supports Trump’s TPP Order While McCain Criticizes Opting Out,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2017) (“Donald Trump has officially killed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the
controversial trade deal that became a lightning rod for critics on the left and right during the election
campaign. . . Trump signed an executive order formally ending the US’s participation in the TPP.”). See Ed
Gerwin, Trade Works, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016).
205
See, e.g., Eric J. Lyman, Giuseppe Conte: Italy’s Next PM to Form Western Europe’s First Populist
Government, USA TODAY (May 22, 2018); Alberto Sisto & Gavin Jones, Italy Says it Won’t Ratify EU-Canada
Trade Deal; Canada Plays Down Threat, REUTERS (July 13, 2018) (“‘If so much as one Italian official . . .
continues to defend treaties like CETA, they will be removed,’ added Di Maio, who leads the anti-establishment
5-Star Movement, which governs the country with the right-wing League.”).
206
A Draft Deal Clarifies What Populist Trade Policy Means in Practice, ECONOMIST (Aug. 30, 2018).
207
Samples, supra note 111, at 117; Alasdair R. Young, Working Paper, Two Wrongs Make a Right? The
Politicization of Trade Policy and European Trade Strategy, (Georgia Institute of Technology, Working Paper
No. GTJMCE-2019-1, 2019); Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, ATLANTIC
(June 23, 2015); Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015).
208
See, e.g., Young, supra note 207; James Shotter & Jim Brunsden, Poland Threatens to Block Part of
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it is highly unlikely—if not impossible—that these projections of growth will
become reality in the foreseeable future.
Yet ISDS serves a purpose. Despite its relative irrelevance in the developed
world, the majority of the existing literature has consistently demonstrated its
usefulness in boosting foreign investment into developing and transition
economies.211 This is not to say ISDS is without controversy in the developing
world: many developing countries have either tried to modify their model
bilateral investment treaties (BIT) to better suit their needs, or withdrew from
existing investor protection regimes altogether (although the latter group of
countries tend to be run by socialist regimes who do not necessarily subscribe to
the ideas of free trade and globalization).212 It must also be stressed that while
the correlation between BITs and higher FDI inflows have been shown to exist,
the causal link between the two remains multi-faceted and poorly understood.213
However, despite the academic fuzziness, the link between IIAs and foreign
investment is well-established in the world of investors and their insurers: the
former are often reluctant to invest in countries sans the cover of an IIA, while
the latter are often reluctant to underwrite uncovered investments.214
Indeed, no controversy has yet managed to dampen the developing world’s
enthusiasm for IIAs. In the 2010s, the annual number of IIAs signed by
developing countries remained largely steady except for 2019, which
nevertheless saw the conclusion of twenty such agreements (figure 5). 215
Regardless of the academic debate surrounding IIAs, it seems unlikely that
developing countries would be so keen to sign on if they did not believe the
economic benefits of these agreements outweigh their disadvantages.
Furthermore, even if developing countries are not entirely sure of the link
between such agreements and investment inflow, they may nevertheless find
IIAs useful for other purposes, such as advancing domestic reforms and

211
See SHIKHER, supra note 128, at 199–200 (reviewing past literature investigating the effects of BITs
and ISDS provisions on investment flows); see also U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of
International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, xii-xiv,
26, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (2009).
212
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INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/impact-investor-statearbitration-developing-countries.
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U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 211, at 6 (2009).
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signalling the advent of these reforms to potential investors.216 At least in the
developing world, it cannot be said that ISDS and the IIAs that contain them
have outlived their usefulness.217
There is hence a need to strike a balance. On one hand, the growing
irrelevancy and unpopularity of ISDS in the developed world have made it a
threat to continued cross-border economic integration. 218 On the other hand,
ISDS mechanisms remain eagerly sought after by developing countries to instill
investor confidence. 219 Given this difference, there is an increasing need for
policymakers to adopt a customized approach towards ISDS—if it is to be
preserved as a means to facilitate investment in countries normally shunned by
foreign investors, without becoming a tool in the hands of first-world populists
to use ISDS as a pretext to tear down free trade.
UMSCA Chapter 14 is a practical approach towards striking this balance.
By sidestepping the assumption that every party to the agreement must be
offered the same terms, U.S. negotiators were able to limit the scope of what
little remained of NAFTA Chapter 11 to a bare minimum, while their Mexican
counterparts were able to tailor Chapter 14 to Mexico’s specific needs. 220
Although Canada may seem ill-accommodated by this arrangement, it must be
again stressed that Canada’s status as a developed country and ISDS link with
Mexico through the CPTPP makes its exclusion from Chapter 14 unlikely to
diminish the country’s investment climate in the long run. Politically, the barebones nature of Chapter 14, free of the pitfalls suffered by NAFTA Chapter 11
as demonstrated in cases such as Metalclad, Ethyl, and Clayton/Bilcon, gives
little ammunition to critics of the USMCA.
In summary, the USMCA strikes the balance between the need of Mexico, a
developing country, to retain ISDS with the United States, and the political need
to eliminate the superfluous ISDS link between Canada and the United States—
which may otherwise jeopardize not only the future of Chapter 14 itself, but also
that of the whole agreement. Chapter 14 will thus able to deflect much of the
216
Klein, supra note 208; Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview,
COLUM. UNIV. (2009).
217
See Primer: International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, COLUMBIA CTR.
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218
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219
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220
See, e.g., David A. Gantz, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Settlement of Disputes,
BAKER INST. (May 2, 2019) (discussing Mexico’s desire to retain ISDS for foreign investment in its oil and gas
sector, in order to assuage fears that the Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s new administration may harbor
anti-FDI tendencies.).
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political controversy surrounding ISDS without inflicting any long-term
changes on cross-border investment pattern and volume between the signatory
states. Therefore, the USMCA is likely to promote economic integration and
development across the North American continent.
IV. CAN USMCA CHAPTER 14 BE A TEMPLATE FOR THE FUTURE?
Outside of the North American context, the Chapter 14 model for IIAs can
be interpreted and expanded into the following: ISDS between developing
countries; no ISDS between developed countries; in multilateral treaties with
investment provisions, ISDS will only be available to claimants who have
invested in a developing signatory state. Finally, surviving ISDS mechanisms
should be strictly voluntary and limited in their scope to key sectors in need of
investment and a way to boost investor confidence. They must not be used to
penalize governments for acting to protect public welfare. This tiered approach
retains ISDS for countries who need it the most, while minimizing the political
risk it poses to free-trade and investment regimes across the world.
However, this model as it stands still leaves some major points of contention
unaddressed. For the sake of brevity, this Comment will select two of these
points and attempt to identify potential solutions.
First, what counts as a legitimate step to protect public welfare? The need to
prevent ISDS from thwarting domestic legislation that protects public health,
safety, and the environment is recognized in both NAFTA and the USMCA.221
However, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which future claimants argue
a government’s purported act to protect public welfare giving is merely a plot to
usurp or sabotage its investment. Leaving the question entirely up to the tribunal
may encourage more controversial rulings in the style of Metalclad, but
attempting to define the phrase with exactitude in the treaty text would be an
impracticably large undertaking.222 Furthermore, attempting to define the phrase
with exactitude would also defeat the whole point of ISDS: having tribunals
settle investor-state disputes based on the particular merits of each case.

221

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, supra note 114, art. 16.
Metalclad, 40 ILM 36, ¶¶ 109–12. See The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Reduced
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Again, there is a need for balance. Between the two aforementioned
extremes, perhaps future ISDS provisions can set the scope of a legitimate step
from a procedural standpoint. Either the offending legislation is passed through
the legislature in full view of the public and investors, or the offending regulation
goes under a process akin to notice-and-comment rulemaking in American
administrative law before making it onto the government gazette (The Federal
Register).223 The goal is to grant potentially-affected investors advance warning
and opportunity to be heard before the law or regulation comes into effect. In
addition, this arrangement would also provide the arbitral tribunal with a “whole
record” of the decision-making process, to determine whether the legislature or
agency: (1) considered important factors; (2) presented adequate rationale; (3)
responded to external feedback; and (4) examined relevant evidence before
making a decision.224 This standard would offer the tribunal clear guidance in
its own decision-making process, without leaving it all to the drafters of the
ISDS mechanism to define whether a government act is a sincere attempt to
protect the public interest. As long as the four aforementioned criteria are met,
the tribunal could be reasonably sure that the law or regulation in question was
passed with legitimate goals in mind.
Second, given all the faults of and controversies surrounding ISDS as it
stands, are there any alternatives to the traditional ISDS model that will better
function as a medium to settle investor-state disputes without getting entangled
in political drama? If such an alternative does exist, then it may be better for
future international trade regimes to discard traditional ISDS in its entirety in
favor of the newer model.
CETA may offer such an alternative, by replacing the ad hoc arbitral
tribunals commonly found in traditional ISDS regimes with a permanent tribunal
made up of fifteen members on retainer.225 Rather than being appointed by the
parties in dispute, the members are instead selected by the CETA Joint
Committee, which is made up of Canadian and E.U. officials and acts as the
governing body of the treaty. 226 CETA also contains a built-in appellate
tribunal. 227 Unlike the NAFTA’s judicial review regime, CETA’s appellate
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tribunal can reverse the lower tribunal’s decision based on errors of law or
fact. 228 Finally, CETA envisages the formation of a standing international
mechanism: Article 8.29 obliges Canada and the European Union to “pursue
with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral investment
tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.”229
If implemented, this Multilateral Investment Court will have jurisdiction over
investor-state disputes around the world.230
The CETA model is evidently designed to address some of the age-old
criticisms that have long hounded the traditional ISDS model. For example, the
ad hoc nature of traditional tribunals has been accused of inviting bias:
arbitrators are not well-paid, and understanding the case law that has
accumulated over the years requires expertise and experience possessed by very
few people. 231 The convergence of these factors has made it increasingly
difficult to find qualified arbitrators who do not have a conflict of interest in the
case at hand.232 A standing tribunal consisting of well-paid arbitrators serving
fixed terms, who are appointed through a public process and must adhere to a
strict standard of impartiality, would help alleviate these concerns.233 Similarly,
the establishment of a standing appellate tribunal with wide-ranging power to
overturn decisions would address the accusation that traditional ISDS (as
exemplified by NAFTA Chapter 11) may leave little room for meaningful
appeal.234
Despite these apparent improvements, the CETA model has not been fully
embraced by opponents of ISDS. Many of its opponents decry the new model
for failing to sufficiently cure the defects of the traditional model, and expanding
the scope of ISDS to the detriment of democracy and domestic governance.235
However, the CETA model also elicited criticisms from investors, who worry
its highly-structured nature would fill the permanent tribunal with pro-state
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judges, reduce regulatory clarity, and increase the length and costs of
proceedings.236
In sum, while CETA’s approach might offer some improvement over its
traditional counterparts in terms of impartiality and transparency, it is unlikely
to be free of the political controversies that have ensnared other iterations of
ISDS. Given the relative newness of both the CETA model (CETA only came
into force provisionally in September 2017) and USMCA Chapter 14, whether
the former’s supposed improvements over the latter can better stimulate crossborder investments remains to be seen.237
CONCLUSION
The USMCA entered into force in July 2020, formally replacing NAFTA as
the premier economic agreement linking the three largest economies of North
America. 238 Although most of the agreement does not represent a radical
overhaul of its NAFTA predecessor, 239 its ISDS chapter strikes a balance
between encouraging investment in developing countries and minimizing
associated political risks—a trait especially useful at a time when the utility and
appeal of ISDS are increasingly called into doubt. While questions regarding
further revisions and potential alternatives remain, the USMCA’s approach
towards investor-state dispute settlement may well prove to be a competitive
template for ISDS mechanisms in the future, to the benefit of economic
development in parts of the world that need it the most.
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